Mobile ad-hoc and sensor networks play an important role in several application fields. The usage of wireless links and the node mobility make the networks prone to security attacks; among these, jamming attacks are insidious and they consist of one or more nodes continuously transmitting dummy packets to keep some wireless links busy. The goal is to destroy the network connectivity or highly reduce its throughput. In this paper we propose a probabilistic formal method, based on a process algebraic approach, targeted at the analysis of connectivity and the evaluation of interference in mobile networks. We show our framework at work on the analysis of an indoor wireless communication scenario.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) consist of a set of wireless communicating devices that independently move in a given space. The mobility of the devices is one of the salient features of MANETs because it implies the impossibility of applying well-known protocols for networks based on static infrastructures. The design of MANETs must face a set of research challenges regarding functional and * Work partially supported by the MIUR Project IPODS "Interacting Processes in Open-ended Distributed Systems".
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. non-functional aspects. Among the functional requirements we mention connectivity that requires the development of reliable protocols on a dynamic infrastructure and unreliable wireless links. Network connectivity is a key-factor also when analysing MANETs' protocol robustness to jamming attacks. These are interferences generated by malicious users that constantly occupy some frequencies with dummy transmissions in the area surrounding their locations. Their goal is to destroy the connectivity of the network or highly reduce its throughput. Although the only possible counter-measure to a jamming attack is the physical removal of the malicious nodes from the network, different protocols may exhibit different robustness. Non-functional requirements are usually expressed in terms of indices for measuring the Quality of Service (QoS), e.g., the system's throughput, latency and overall energy consumption. In this paper we resort to the calculus introduced in [10] that allows for the formal specification of MANETs in terms of modular composition of its nodes. More technically, our calculus is a probabilistic and non-deterministic process algebra whose semantics is inspired by Segala's automata [13] . Node mobility is modelled probabilistically; the region where the MANET works is discretised into arbitrary small parts, and the mobility behaviour of the nodes is modelled by a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC). The state of wireless links and the behaviour of the protocols are non-deterministic.
The analysis of this model allows one to derive several functional properties of the MANETs, e.g., the observation equivalence of two protocols for a reliable communication over an unreliable channel can be proved [4] . In order to obtain quantitative indices of the network (e.g., throughput, response time, utilisation, energy consumption) the model must be transformed into a purely probabilistic one. This is done by means of schedulers in a similar fashion to [5] .
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a methodology for the analysis of the resilience of MANETs' routing protocols to jamming attacks. Roughly speaking, we say that a routing protocol that governs a network N is resilient to a jamming attack if the functional behaviour of N without the jammer is equivalent -according to some observation semantics -to the functional behaviour of N when the jammer is introduced. It is worth of notice that the peculiarity of this approach is the analysis of a protocol in a scenario, i.e., the outcomes of the connectivity analysis depend on the protocol definition and the mobility properties of the nodes. For instance, one may decide to analyse the connectivity of a network in which highly mobile nodes have the roles of routing packets that could be destroyed by jammers. The mobility of these nodes could ensure the resilience up to a given number of jammers. We apply our methodology to study the resilience of two MANETs' routing protocols to jamming attacks. In particular, we study if under different scenarios and spatial distribution of the jammers, the protocols are able to ensure the network connectivity among the nodes that are not directly disturbed by the attackers. We consider two different routing strategies for the Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP), the first based on the reactive Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol and the second using a proactive treebased approach. It is worth of notice that our calculus can be encoded into the probabilistic calculi used by automatic tools, such as the PRISM model checker [8] . As a consequence, more complicated scenarios than that considered here could be studied.
Related Works. Probabilistic and stochastic models are widely used in the design and verification of complex systems. Palamidessi et al. in [5] define an extension of the applied pi-calculus with non-deterministic and probabilistic choice operators. In the context of performance evaluation, in [7] Hillston introduces the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA) that is used for modelling systems consisting of concurrently active components which co-operate and share work. Bernardo et al. introduce EMPA gr [1] , an extended Markovian process algebra including probabilities, priority and exponentially distributed durations. All these calculi abstract out the interferences, since they consider only atomic actions, and they do not allow multiple devices to transmit at the same time. The problem of interference is considered by Sangiorgi et al. [9] who propose a calculus to detect collisions due to the simultaneous transmissions of two or more devices. Differently from our work, their calculus does not support mobility of nodes. In the literature two types of jamming strategies are distinguished: proactive jammers keep the channel permanently occupied so that no transmissions are possible whereas reactive jammers only jam once an ongoing transmission has been detected. In [15] , Xu et al. provide a detailed classification, and show how to distinguish interferences due to network collisions from the jamming caused by malicious attackers. Strasser et al. [14] show that it is extremely difficult to distinguish reactive jamming from simple network congestions.
Plan of the paper. Section 2 introduces our calculus. Section 3 defines the methodology for evaluating resilience to a jamming attack. Section 4 introduces a case study. Section 5 develops an effective proof technique and in Section 6 we apply it to the case study. Section 7 concludes the paper.
THE CALCULUS
The framework we propose is based on the probabilistic calculus presented in [10] . We introduce here a slightly simplified version of this calculus by focusing on its main peculiarity, the non-atomicity of the output and input actions to capture the presence of interferences caused by the simultaneous transmissions of two (or more) nodes.
Syntax. We use letters c for channels, n for nodes, l for locations, r for transmission radii, x and y for variables. Closed values contain nodes, locations, transmission radii and any basic value (booleans, integers, ...). Values include also variables. We use u and v for closed values and w for (open) values. We writeṽ,w for tuples of values. N denotes the set of all networks, and Loc the set of all locations.
Networks are collections of nodes, running in parallel and using channels to communicate messages. -0 denotes the empty network; -M 1|M2 is the parallel composition of two networks; -n[P ] l is a network node named n located at the physical location l, and executing the process P ; -(νc)M is a network where the channel c is private with scope M . Note that given the structure of the syntactic productions, channels may not be dynamically created and thus (νc)M simply plays the role of a CCS-style hiding operator. Of course, since channels represent radio frequencies, they may not be hidden in practice. Indeed, the use of the hiding operator is only meant to specialize the verification method to some specific class of contexts as we will see later. Processes are sequential and live within the nodes: -0 is the inactive process; -in(c,x).P is ready to listen to a transmission; here the variables inx are bound with scope in P ; -out c r ,w .P is ready to transmit; here tag r represents the transmission radius of the sender: the choice of specific transmission ranges may depend on various parameters, and is left to the process running inside the transmitter node.
-[w 1 = w2]P, Q behaves as P if w1 = w2, as Q otherwise.
-A w is the process defined via a (possibly recursive) definition A(x) def = P , with |x| = |w| wherex contains all channels and variables that are free in P . In the dynamic of the calculus processes that are ready to send or receive evolve into active senders and receivers: -c(x).P is actively receiving a tuplew of (closed) values via channel c and continues as P {w/x}, i.e., as P withw substituted forx (where |x| = |w|); -c r w .P is transmitting a tuple of valuesw via channel c and then continues as P. We say that a process P is active if it is in prefix form, with the prefix denoting an active input or output action. Predicate Active(P ) is true when P is active, and A(M ) denotes the network composed of all the active nodes in M , i.e., all nodes n[P ] l in M with P active. Each node n is associated with a pair r n, J n , where rn is a non negative real number denoting the maximum transmission radius that n can use to transmit, while J n is the transition matrix of a discrete time Markov chain: each entry J n lk denotes the probability that the node n located at l may move to the location k. Hence, k∈Loc J n lk = 1 for all locations l ∈ Loc. Static nodes are associated with the identity Markov chain, i.e., the identity matrix J n ll = 1 for l ∈ Loc and J n lk = 0 for l = k. We note by µ n l the probability distribution associated with node n located at l, that is, the function over Loc such that µ n l (k) = J n lk , for all k ∈ Loc. Let n be a node of a network M and l its location. We denote by M {n : l /l} the network obtained by substituting l by l in n and by M µ n l the probability distribution over networks induced by µ n l and defined by: for all networks M ,
Intuitively, M µ n l (M ) is the probability that network M evolves to M due to the movement of its node n located at l. We say that M is in the support of
We write M ∆ for the Dirac distribution on network M , namely the probability distribution defined as: Table 1 : Reduction Semantics we let θ range over {µ n l | n is a node and l ∈ Loc} ∪ {∆}. A message broadcast by a node is received only by the nodes that lie in the area delimited by the transmission radius of the sender. We presuppose a function d(·, ·) which takes two locations and returns the distance separating them.
Reduction semantics. The dynamics of the calculus is specified by the probabilistic reduction relation − → in Table 1: M − → M θ denotes a transition that leaves from M and leads to a probability distribution M θ . As usual, reduction relies on a structural congruence ≡, such that, e.g.,
The synchronization over a wireless channel is described by the rules (R-Bgn-Bcast) and (R-End-Bcast). (R-Bgn-Bcast) models the start of a transmission, with node n transiting from ready to active state to transmit messageṽ on channel c with radius r. The state change in n may cause a collision, which the rule captures as follows. We abuse the notation and write n h ∈ H to note nodes n h with h ∈ H, for any index set H. The premise of the rule describes a situation in which nodes n i ∈ I and n k ∈ K are actively involved in a synchronization, while node n and the n j ∈ J are in (output and input, respectively) ready state. Given that all the active transmitters are out of n's range (because d(l, l i) > ri), n transits into active state: this awakes the n j ∈ J, as they are now in range of an active transmitter, and at the same time causes a collision at the n k ∈ K, which also are in range and were already active on input: as a result the n k ∈ K exit their active state, receiving the error signal ⊥. All the remaining active receivers that do not sense a collision, and are in the range of an active sender may conclude the synchronisation, as described by the (R-End-Bcast) rule. According to rule (R-Move), a node n located at l and executing a move action will reach a location with probability described by the distribution µ n l that depends on the Markov chain J n statically associated with n. We assume that a node can move only if it is not actively involved in any synchronization. This is a fairly common assumption in wireless networks in which wireless synchronization may be assumed to be orders of magnitude faster than node mobility. All the remaining rules are standard. However, notice that an application of the (R-Par) rule may cause messages to be lost by active receivers located within the range of an active sender, even when there is no interference. Similarly, an application of (R-Par) may exclude any set of active senders and/or receivers from a synchronization: in both cases, the network is left in an inconsistent state, with active senders (dually receivers) and no receiver (sender) in range. In order to disregard these situations, we will resort to the notion of "admissible scheduler" (to be discussed shortly) to guide the dynamics of networks through "well-formed" executions. Given a network M , we write
... We write ExecM for the set of all possible executions starting from M , last(e) for the final state of a finite execution e, e j for the prefix execution M − → θ 1 M1 . . . − → θ j Mj of length j of the execution e = M − → θ 1 M1 · · · − → θ j Mj− → θ j+1 Mj+1 · · · , and e ↑ for the set of e such that e≤ pref ix e . We write M − → * M if there exists a finite execution e ∈ Exec M with last(e) = M . We denote by behave(M ) the set
In order to solve the nondeterminism in a network execution, we consider each possible transition M − → M θ as arising from a scheduler (see [13] ). A scheduler is a total function F assigning to a finite execution e a distribution N θ ∈ behave(last(e)). We define the set of executions starting from a network M and driven by a scheduler F as:
Given a finite execution e = M − → θ 1 M1...− → θ k M k starting from M and driven by a scheduler F we define 
. Given a measurable set of networks H, we note by Exec F M (H) the set of executions starting from M and crossing a state in H, i.e., Exec
∈ H for some j}. We denote the probability for a network M to evolve into a network in H according to F as P rob
We consider the class of well-formed networks (resp. executions) where, (1) a transmitter, before transiting in active state checks that, locally, the communication channel is not presently busy with other transmissions, and (2) each active receiver in the network is in the transmission cell of exactly one transmitter. Formally, we restrict the set of all schedulers to the specific set of admissible schedulers. We say that channel c is at the top level of a network M , denoted c ∈ Top(M ), if M ≡ (νd)(n[P ] l | N ) and P is of the form in(c,x).Q; c(x).Q; out c L,r ,w .Q; orcL,r w .Q.
RESISTANCE TO JAMMING
We present a methodology, based on observation equivalences, for evaluating resistance to jammings. Roughly speaking, we say that a network N , governed by a specific routing protocol, is resilient to a jamming attack if the behaviour of N in a context without the jammer is observational equivalent to the behaviour of N in the presence of the jammer. We formalize the observational semantics of our calculus in terms of a notion barb [11] . We first introduce a notation for strong barb: for a network M , we write M ↓ c@K when M ≡ (νd)(n[c r ṽ .P ] l | M ), with c ∈d, K ⊆ Loc and for all k ∈ K, d(l, k) ≤ r. We say that a well-formed network M has a barb with probability p on a channel c at locations in K according to the scheduler F , written M ⇓
Schedulers constitute an essential feature for modeling communication protocols as they provide freedom in modeling implementation and incomplete knowledge of the system. However, many schedulers could be unrealistic or useless. Consider, e.g., schedulers giving priority to movements over communications which possibly prevent any node transmission, or schedulers giving priority to end broadcasting over begin broadcasting which will prevent any interference. In this paper we specialize the observational semantics given in [10] in order to compare the behaviour of networks relative to a restricted set of schedulers. Since our semantics is contextual, we need to ensure that the set of schedulers we consider allows the specific networks we analyze to interact with any possible context. Hence, for a set F of schedulers and a set M = {M 1, M2, ...} of networks, we define the contextual superset F M of F relative to M, as the largest set of schedulers allowing M 1, M2, ... to interact with any possible context even when driven by F (see [2] for a formal definition). Hereafter a context is a network term with a hole [·] defined by the grammar:
Our probabilistic observational congruence relative to a specific set of schedulers is defined as follows. -R is reduction closed relative to FM if M RN implies that for all F ∈ F M, there exists F ∈ FM such that for all classes C ∈ N/R, P rob
, is the largest symmetric relation over networks which is reduction closed and barb preserving relative to F M, and contextual. The resistance to jamming of a network N governed by a specific routing protocol is evaluated by comparing the observational behaviour of N with the behaviour of the same network in the jamming context. Definition 2 (Jamming-resistance). Let N be a network and C[·] be a context consisting of a malicious jamming node. Let F be a set of schedulers andc be a set of channels. We say that N is jamming-resistant in the context C[·], relative to the set of schedulers F and independently from communications over channelsc, if
The hiding operator (νc) is used here to specialize the verification method to some specific class of communications.
CASE STUDY
Let us consider an in-door MANET operating in a building of 25 × 25 meters with three floors whose height is 3 meters. For the sake of simplicity, we assume each floor to have the same topology: eight rooms connected by a central corridor as shown in Figure 1 . A location is denoted by a pair f, r where f ∈ {1, 2, 3} indicates the floor, while r ∈ {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, S} indicates the room. Rooms A, B, C, D, E, F have dimension 5 × 5 meters, while G, H, S have dimension 10 × 15 meters. The MANET consists of seven devices: three stationary nodes (n 1, n2, n3), located respectively in the first, second and third floor, which represent the servers inside the building, and four mobile nodes (n 4, n5, n6, n7). Nodes can transmit with three transmission radii: r 1 = 5m, r2 = 10m and r3 = 15m. We assume the network uses omnidirectional antennas, and adopt the euclidean function to evaluate the distance between two locations. Hence, a node sending a message with radius r 1 can reach only those nodes lying in the adjacent rooms, or in the same room of an adjacent floor, while using radius r 2 the successfulness of a reception depends on the kind of rooms the sender and the receivers are occupying. We assume that each transmission always begins exactly from the centre of a room. In practice, if n 1 is located at l = 1, A and n2 is located at k = 2, A then their distance is d(l, k) = 3m. Hence, they are able to mutually communicate by using any of the transmission radii in {r 1, r2, r3}. If n1 is located at l = 1, C , then the Euclidean distance between l and k is d(l , k) = √ 109. Since 10 < √ 109 < 15, n1 and n2 can communicate only using radius r 3.
The Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP) is the routing protocol used by IEEE 802.11s [6] . It can be configured to operate in two modes: on-demand reactive mode and tree-based proactive mode. The reactive mode is based on the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing protocol (AODV) [3, 12] . It uses three types of control packets whose forwarding allows each node to update its information about the best path to reach a specific destination. Each node maintains information about its neighbours in its route table, where each entry contains the following data associated with a given destination d: The protocol exchanges three types of control packets: -RREQ (Route Request): when a node needs to find a path, it broadcasts a RREQ message and then, when it receives the response, it chooses the cheapest path (in terms of energy costs, delays, number of hops, etc.); -RREP (Route Response): When a node receives a RREQ message, it controls if it is the destination. In this case it immediately sends back the response, otherwise it searches a valid path in its route table to send back. If there are no valid paths, it propagates the RREQ packet; -RERR (Route Error): the error message informing the network of a link breakage.
The tree-based proactive mode used by the HWMP protocol is based on a proactive protocol in which the network topology is built statically, forming a tree rooted in a chosen node. As in the previous mode, packet types, apart from root announcements, are RREQ, RREP and RERR. The difference lays in the fact that network topology is built statically from the start, and each node selects as the next hop the neighbour node that is nearest to the root according to its hop count, but it also maintains a table that contains the hop count to the root of its neighbours. The final result of these operations is that a spanning tree is created and used for the subsequent message forwarding. Whenever a node detects that the link with the upstream node, i.e., the node to which it would normally forward packets, is broken, it selects a new upstream node from its neighbours using the table of the hop counts, updates its own count and then broadcasts a RRER message to the downstream nodes. Then, these can select their own alternative paths if the hop count of the upstream node is no longer the shortest one. If a new path is chosen, the RERR message is propagated to the downstream nodes. The effect of this action is to build a new spanning subtree. In what follows we assume that the root node, e.g., a gateway between a wired network and the wireless one, is chosen statically and that it never moves.
Modelling the system. We model our case study into the framework of Section 2. The set of feasible locations is: Loc = { f, r : f ∈ {1, 2, 3}∧r ∈ {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, S}}. Each node n i is statically characterised by a pair rn i , J n i , where r n is the maximum transmission radius, i.e., in our scenario r n i = r3 for all ni, with i = 1, . . . , 7, and J n i is the transition matrix of a discrete time Markov chain denoting the probability of movements. In its simplest definition, the routing table maintained by each node has the form: We consider the behaviour of the network assuming that a node needing a path to a given destination simply obtains it by calling the procedure find path(s, d) where s and d are the source and destination nodes. The effect of this procedure is to update the node's routing table. We consider the following network N , where ∀i ∈ [1−7] , l i ∈ Loc; here nodes n 4 and n6 want to communicate: x1, x2, x3) ).[x2 = n6](find path(n6, n4). out c r 2 , (ack, nexthop n 4 , n4) ).P6
and ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 7}: path(ni, n6) . out c r 2 , (x1, nexthop n 6 , n6) ).Pi).
Node n4 uses the function find path to discover the path to n 6, and then forwards the packet. When it receives the acknowledgment it fires the message OK through the channel ok. Node n 6 waits for the packet from n4 and, when it receives it, it sends back the acknowledgment. Each intermediate node executes a simple process forwarding both the packet sent by n 4 and the ack of n6. These processes will be used to study both the AODV and the tree-based protocols, the only difference is the way the function find path behaves: while in the AODV the path is discovered after the RREQ, RREP and RERR packages exchange, in the tree-based protocol, in order to find the best path, the process simply follows the predetermined routing spanning tree, built at the moment of the initial network setup through the algorithm informally described above.
(Beg-Out) We consider different jamming attacks. We focus our attention on proactive jammers, executing the following process: P = out c r 2 , JAM .P which continuously broadcasts the dummy message JAM with radius r 2 on channel c. We consider two malicious nodes: a static jamming attacker m 1 identified by r2, I , with I being the identity matrix, located at k = 1, H , and a mobile node m 2 identified by r2, J m 2 whose initial location is k = 3, G . Note that the jammer m 1 is a node blocking the activity of each node lying within
We study the behaviour of the protocol in a context C 1 consisting of node m 1, and in a context C2 consisting of both m 1 and m2. We consider the set of schedulers F such that:
(1) during the forwarding of the packets (x 1, x2, x3) where x 1 ∈ {msg, ack}, movements of nodes ni with i ∈ [4 − 7] occurs at each collision or JAM-message reception, (2) the beginning of output actions have priority on their ending.
The robustness of the network using the HWMP protocol against the malicious node m 1 can be verified by checking if the observational behaviour of N is independent of the presence of the jammer inside the building. Formally, we have to prove that:
. The restriction operator νc is used to limit the observation to the communications between nodes n 4 and n6. Indeed, since c is hidden, the only observable action in (νc)N and
where m2 is a mobile node, meaning that the jamming area may change in time. In this case, we have to prove that:
PROOF TECHNIQUE
We present a bisimulation-based proof technique for ∼ = F M p which is built upon a LTS semantics. Table 2 presents the LTS rules for processes. Transitions are of the form P η − → P , where η ranges over input and output actions, defined by:
η ::= c |cϑ |c r |crṽ with ϑ ::=ṽ | ⊥.
Rule (End-In) models either the correct reception of a message or the reception of a ⊥ due to a collision. Table 3 
With abuse of notation, we define Exec M , last(e), e j and e ↑ as for unlabeled executions. We denote by lbehave(M ) the set
1 for the labelled semantics is a function F assigning a pair (α, M θ ) ∈ lbehave(last(e)) with a finite labelled execution e. We note by LSched the set of (admissible) schedulers for the LTS semantics and by Exec 
We are interested in a notion of bisimilarity which is a complete characterisation of our observational congruence. Since the latter is relative to a set of schedulers F M, we need to define the corresponding setF M for the LTS semantics [2] .
(Beg-Snd) 
, is the largest symmetric probabilistic labelled bisimulation relative toFM over networks.
Probabilistic labelled bisimilarity is a complete characterisation our probabilistic observational congruence. 
PROVING RESILIENCE TO JAMMING
In order to verify resilience of our network case study with respect to the jamming context C 1, we check whether
By using the proof technique presented in Section 5, it is sufficient to find a probabilistic bisimulation containing the pair ( is an intermediate node in the path from n4 to n6, we are done, since, when n 4 does not receive the acknowledge, it searches another path to reach n 6 and it sends again the message. If the node receiving the collision is the source or the destination of the communication (n 4, n6), the bisimulation depends on the transition matrix modelling its mobility: if the node, with a finite number h of steps, goes far away from the jammer with probability 1, i.e., the probability to end up in an ergodic set in which all states represents locations inside the jammed area is 0, then the bisimulation is proved, otherwise the probability for C 1 [N ] to reach a state in C is 1 − p, where p = l ∈Loc jam J n i (h) ll . Moreover, when the protocol uses the tree-based strategy and the root nodes are static (e.g., n 1, n2 and n3), if the node receiving the collision is the root itself, it can never be possible to detect an alternative route, thus the bisimulation does not hold.
Consider now the context:
To prove that (νc)N ∼ = The proof proceeds as above, but here the second jammer is mobile and thus we have to consider all its possible locations. Let the Markov chain J n i m 2 be the joint process between J n i and J m 2 , in which states are pairs (l, k) of states of the chains J n i and J m 2 , which are associated with nodes n i and m2, respectively. Hence, each pair (l, k) of J n i m 2 means that ni is located at l and m2 is located at k. We consider a subset S n i m 2 of J n i m 2 , such that (l, k) ∈ S n i m 2 ⇔ d(l, k) ≥ rm 2 , i.e., all combinations of states in which the jammer can interfere with the node n i. n i can always communicate successfully (then the bisimulation holds) only if the probability to end up in an ergodic set of states members of S n i m 2 is 0. When using the tree-based mode, if the root nodes are static, even if n 4 and n6, when jammed, are able to reach a safe location with probability 1, the success of the communication depends on the root nodes, and if the root nodes are jammed, n 4 and n6 may not be able to find a valid path to complete their communication.
CONCLUSION
In the previous section, we applied our methodology for evaluating the resilience to jamming attacks of a wireless network governed by two different modes of protocol HWMP. Even if both relations R and S defined above are proved to be bisimulations only under particular conditions depending on the mobility of nodes, with our proof technique we have been able to show that the reactive approach used by the HWMP protocol is more robust against jamming than the proactive one, since, when using the tree-based routing, the bisimulations are proved under more restricted conditions which depend on the mobility behaviours of the root nodes.
